The PG&E Saga: A Cautionary Tale Against Regulated Capitalism and WEF-Style "Stakeholder" Solutions

  


Title: The PG&E Saga: A Cautionary Tale Against Regulated Capitalism and WEF-Style "Stakeholder" Solutions

Introduction: From Model Utility to Public Failure

For decades, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) embodied the promise of regulated capitalism—a system where government oversight ensures monopolies like utilities serve the public good while remaining viable businesses. In the mid-20th century, PG&E was widely praised for its efficiency, reliability, and innovative planning, including vast hydroelectric networks that powered California's post-WWII economic boom. It was seen as a model utility, with interconnected plants supplying millions across Northern and Central California.

The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) regulated rates to balance affordability with utility profits, while unions like the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW Local 1245) ensured stable, well-paid jobs and safety standards. It was a "beautiful" equilibrium: public responsibility was executed effectively, and stakeholders (ratepayers, workers, shareholders) all benefited.

By the 1990s–2010s, however, this model unraveled—not due to external disruptors like rooftop solar (PV), but internal failures in focus and accountability. Deregulation experiments (e.g., 1996's AB 1890) introduced partial market restructuring, freezing retail rates while exposing utilities to volatile wholesale prices. Key players—CPUC, PG&E, SCE, and IBEW—did not fully embrace competition; instead, implementation choices (limited long-term contracting, forced divestiture of generation assets, reliance on spot markets) created perverse incentives that undermined the intended benefits. This half-baked approach made the system fragile, allowing aggressive traders like Enron to exploit loopholes through market manipulation (e.g., artificial shortages, congestion gaming), driving wholesale prices sky-high and triggering the 2000–2001 energy crisis, rolling blackouts, and PG&E's first bankruptcy in 2001.

Deferred maintenance sparked disasters like the 2010 San Bruno gas pipeline explosion (killing 8 and injuring dozens) and the 2010s wildfires (e.g., the 2018 Camp Fire, killing 85 and destroying Paradise), costing $30B+ in liabilities and triggering a second bankruptcy in 2019.

Critics from across the spectrum (left-leaning outlets like Left Voice and World Socialist Web Site, and right-leaning ones like the Independent Institute) attribute this to regulatory capture: CPUC deference to utilities, prioritization of profits over safety, and alliances with unions protecting turf amid rising costs. Ratepayers faced skyrocketing bills (7–11% annual hikes on average) and reliability drops (e.g., preventive Public Safety Power Shutoffs), while executives pocketed bonuses and shareholders sought returns.

Rooftop solar adoption was a grassroots response to this breakdown, not the cause. As rates climbed and outages loomed, Californians turned to PV for self-reliance—only to face pushback via NEM 3.0's export credit cuts (2022–2023), which crashed the market (80%+ drop in installations, 17,000+ jobs lost).

Independent studies, like Richard McCann's M.Cubed analysis, show solar actually saved all ratepayers $1.5–2.3 billion annually (with ~$1.5 billion benefiting non-solar customers) by reducing peak demand, avoiding infrastructure costs, and eliminating transmission losses—not shifting burdens.


The Broader Critique: Why WEF-Style Solutions Mirror This Failure

This PG&E arc exemplifies why "solutions" from the World Economic Forum (WEF)—promoting stakeholder capitalism (balancing interests of shareholders, workers, communities, and environment) and the "Great Reset" (a post-COVID recovery plan for sustainable, equitable systems)—are flawed. Even if they deliver short-term stability (as PG&E did historically), they risk losing focus, failing the people they serve, and locking in limited options under centralized control.

  • WEF's Vision: Stakeholder capitalism, coined by WEF founder Klaus Schwab in the 1970s and central to the 2020 Great Reset, calls for businesses and regulators to serve all stakeholders, not just shareholders. Goals include addressing inequality, climate change, and pandemics via "inclusive" regulated markets. Proponents (e.g., BlackRock's Larry Fink) argue it allocates capital efficiently for "durable profitability." The Great Reset urges a "reset" of capitalism for resilience.

  • Historical and Practical Failures: Like PG&E's regulated model, stakeholder capitalism has faltered before. From the 1930s–1970s in the U.S., it led to "garbage can organizations"—confused priorities, endless compromises among conflicting stakeholders, and no clear "true north" (e.g., prioritizing workers vs. environment vs. profits). A 2020 "report card" on Business Roundtable signatories (who pledged stakeholder focus in 2019) found little fundamental change: companies like Salesforce conducted layoffs amid profits, with minimal progress on jobs, equality, or safety during COVID. Detractors call it "incoherent" (failing real-world market standards) or a "revamp of terrible ideas," masking elite control without true accountability. In regulated sectors like utilities, it parallels PG&E's issues: initial success gives way to capture by insiders (executives, unions, regulators), neglecting public needs.


  • NWO Conspiracy Angle: The Great Reset has been linked to conspiracy theories labeling it a "New World Order" plot for global control (e.g., abolishing property or using COVID for depopulation). Fact-checks clarify it's an economic recovery framework, not tyranny—but skeptics argue its top-down, elite-led nature echoes regulated failures like PG&E, where people lose options to centralized decisions.


Conclusion: The Need for Decentralized Alternatives

PG&E's fall—from praised model to disaster-plagued monopoly—shows how regulated/stakeholder systems erode over time: initial alignment devolves into self-preservation, failing the people (rising rates, blackouts, stifled innovation). WEF proposals risk the same on a global scale—promising balance but entrenching elites with few escapes for individuals.

True solutions? Empower bottom-up innovation (e.g., fair NEM tweaks at 25–50% retail export rates for small systems ≤30kW, without upgrade mandates) and decentralize power—literally and figuratively. California's spirit of free enterprise could lead the way, if we demand regulators refocus on public interest over padded pockets.

This version is now tighter, more professional, and ready for publication (e.g., on a blog, Substack, or opinion site). If you'd like adjustments (e.g., shorter/longer, more emphasis on certain parts, or a different tone), let me know.


References and Links (Consolidated List)

1, M.Cubed Consulting / Richard McCann Studies (Rooftop Solar Benefits)


2. CPUC & NEM 3.0 Official Documents

3. Lawsuits & Legal Challenges to NEM 3.0


4. PG&E History & Wildfire / Bankruptcy References

5. Industry & Advocacy Reports (Solar Job Losses, NEM Impacts)


Broader Stakeholder Capitalism / WEF Critiques


Curtis Neil/ Grok 4.0 January 28th. 2026

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